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Michael Murphy 
 We estimate the impact of migration on population size in 11 European 
countries from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present. We derive 
estimates under the assumption of zero net migration from various points 
during this period using information from the Human Mortality Database 
(HMD). We find disparate patterns among countries: net positive inflows for 
Switzerland and France, with the largest net outflows for Norway and Scotland. 
We develop methods to decompose population growth into estimates of net 
migration that include the contribution of descendants of migrants and natural 
increase. Migration has a substantial effect on population growth across these 
countries and tends to reduce disparities in growth rates. For most of the 
countries considered, population sizes would be smaller in 2000 if there had 
been no migration over the past 150 years, but more recent trends suggest a 
qualitatively different future. 
 
Michael Murphy is Professor of Demography, Department of Social Policy, 
London School of Economics. 
  
2   
The Impact of Migration on Long-Term European Population Trends, 1850 to 
Present 
Michael Murphy 
RELATIVELY LITTLE attention has been paid to the long-term implications of 
international migration for national population size. The most common 
approach is to produce future scenarios that compare population sizes and 
structures from projections that include assumptions with and without net 
migration (United Nations Population Division 2000; Holzmann 2005; Lutz and 
Scherbov 2007). Such scenarios are often included in official projections (Office 
for National Statistics 2015; United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs 2015). Some scenarios are stylized and designed to show that 
certain objectives cannot plausibly be met, such as that South Korea would 
need to import the whole world’s population by 2050 to maintain the current 
ratio of its working-age population (aged 15–64) to people aged 65 and older 
(United Nations Population Division 2000; Coleman 2002). Other studies 
compare a no-net-migration scenario with the best current forecast as found in 
official population projections to show the impact on population size and 
structure of the migration assumptions adopted. Even such realistic 
projections, however, must be treated with caution since long-term trends are 
often formulated by assuming continuation of current patterns, whereas 
experience suggests that migration is volatile and the constant or modest 
trends drifting toward zero in most scenarios are clearly unrealistic. It is 
therefore instructive to look at how migration has affected long-term 
population trends in practice as well as in theory.  
In the following I develop models to estimate the total impact on 
population size of net migration, including not only emigrants and immigrants 
but also their descendants. I compare trends in 11 European countries from 
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the mid-nineteenth century to the present to show the heterogeneity of trends 
and consider the relative contribution of net migration and natural population 
change to long-term population growth. Finally, I examine whether recent 
trends are a continuation of long-term patterns or suggest the emergence of a 
qualitatively different European migration regime. 
 
Data and methods  
Data are taken from the Human Mortality Database (HMD), which includes 
estimates of mortality rates and population size by single year of age and sex 
for each calendar year, together with information on total annual numbers of 
births and deaths. These estimates are constructed using a uniform method 
applied to information from validated official statistics such as censuses, vital 
registration, and population estimates (Wilmoth et al. 2007; Human Mortality 
Database 2015). Since I am interested in long-term trends, I confine attention 
to 11 countries with at least 100 years of continuous data: five Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), five from Western 
Europe (England and Wales, Scotland (both treated for present purposes as 
separate countries), France, Netherlands, and Switzerland), and Italy in 
Southern Europe. These countries account for just over half of the total 
population size of Northern, Western, and Southern Europe as defined by the 
United Nations.  
Estimates such as the 55 million Europeans who left for the Americas 
and Australasia between 1850 and 1914 (Hatton and Williamson 1998)—a 
number that Okólski (2012, p. 8) contextualizes as one fifth of Europe’s 1850 
population—suggest that migration had a major impact on European 
population growth. However, I am concerned with population change and 
therefore concentrate on net rather than gross flows. Historically, net 
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migration numbers are considerably smaller than both gross numbers and 
natural increase. For example, in four large Western European countries, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden, in the peak period of inter-continental 
European migration, 1880 to 1913, there were 106.0 million births and 76.5 
million deaths, resulting in a natural increase of 29.4 million, compared with 
6.6 million net out-migrants based on HMD data. Net migration flows were 
considerably smaller than gross flows based on sources such as ship passenger 
arrival records, with return rates being two or three times higher than had 
often been assumed (Bandiera et al. 2013). 
My primary goal is to compare national patterns from 1850, or the first 
available year if this is later, to the last available year around 2011 (see 
Appendix Table A.1).* Only limited data are available for the first half of the 
nineteenth century when transatlantic migration was described as just a trickle 
compared with later flows (Ferrie and Hatton 2015, p. 56) and intra-European 
migration in North-Western Europe was at historically low levels (van Lottum 
2007, Table 5.1). I estimate the effect of migration in a given period by 
comparing a later actual population with the same population that 
experienced no net migration over that period.1 I calculate the survivors of 
cohorts without migration from various time points starting from either the 
first available year or 1850. For example, with a start year of 1850, all values 
before that date are unaltered. In years after 1850, the numbers in the no-net-
migration population aged a in year t of those born before 1850 are given by:  
Pnomig(a,t) = Pactual(a–(t–1850),1850) Lx(a,t)/Lx(a–(t–1850),1850) 
                                                          
* Appendix is available at the supporting information tab at wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pdr. 
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where nomig refers to the no-migration population and actual to the original 
actual population. Lx(a,t–a) are the Lx values for age a based on a life table for 
the cohort t–a with radix set to 1. For those born after 1850, the population 
numbers in the absence of migration are given by 
Pnomig(a,t) = Bnomig(t–a)Lx(a,t–a) 
where Bnomig(t–a) is births in year t–a (equivalently for birth cohort t–a). If the 
first available year is later than 1850, I start calculations in that year. 
Cohort life tables from age zero to the age reached by the last available 
year (or age 110 if reached earlier) are available for some cohorts in the HMD 
(Appendix Table A.1). For other cohorts, I derived my own life tables using 
mortality rates from HMD. Cohort mortality rates are available for earlier 
cohorts, so I constructed partial life tables for these cohorts from the age at 
which the cohort reached the start year up to age 110. Cohort mortality rates 
are also available for later cohorts up to around 1980, so I constructed cohort 
life tables to the age reached at the last available year for these cohorts. For 
those born after about 1980, only period mortality rates are available, so 
approximate cohort life tables for those born in year t were calculated using 
mortality rates for age 0 in year t, age 1 in year t+1, and so on up to the latest 
available year.  
The no-net-migration population is assumed to have the same fertility 
and mortality patterns as the actual population for reasons set out below. 
Because annual information on age-specific fertility is not available over the 
extended period for which mortality data are available, I estimate the expected 
number of births as follows. The distribution of age-specific fertility rates f(a), 
with ∑ 𝑓(𝑎)𝑎 = 1, is given by a beta distribution, β(2.7,2.7), scaled between 
ages 15 and 45, with a mean of 30 years and a standard deviation of 6 years. 
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This is a typical fertility pattern for populations over this period. The actual 
number of births in year t, Bactual(t), is therefore given by:  
Bactual (t) = k(t)ΣaPactual (a,t)f(a) (1) 
where Pactual(a,t) is the actual population aged a in year t. This provides an 
estimate of k(t), the level of fertility in year t, as the expected number of 
children per adult with the above fertility distribution, and k(t)f(a) as the age-
specific fertility rates (note that f(a) may also be time-dependent as discussed 
in the Appendix). 
The number of births in the no-net-migration population is calculated as 
Bnomig(t) = k(t)ΣaPnomig(a,t)f(a). (2) 
Therefore equation 1 provides an estimate of the level of fertility k(t), and 
equation 2 provides an estimate of Bnomig(t). 
Thus I assume that the ratio of births Bnomig(t) to Bactual(t) is equal to the 
ratio of the corresponding populations at risk of reproducing weighted by the 
values of a representative fertility schedule. This is an indirect standardization 
method, similar to that used by Calot and Sardón 2001), with the standard 
population being that of a typical fertile population. I use the schedule for 
populations with both sexes combined rather than just for women as in most 
applications, but this makes no difference to the substantive conclusions (for 
further details see the Appendix).  
I constructed a period measure analogous to the conventional net 
reproduction rate by summing the product of age-specific fertility rates and 
the Lx values in the period life table of a given year to obtain the expected 
number of children a newborn would expect to have if s/he experienced these 
period fertility and mortality rates throughout life. I estimated an intrinsic rate 
of growth, r, as r = ln(NRR)/30, where NRR is the net reproduction rate, which 
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is approximately the annual intrinsic rate of growth continued for the mean 
length of a generation, here assumed to be 30 years (Wachter 2014, p. 233). I 
use this intrinsic rate of growth to index the natural demographic regime (i.e. 
fertility and mortality only) in these countries over time.  
 
Fertility assumptions for no-net-migration scenarios 
I assumed that the fertility rates of the no-net-migration population are the 
same as those of the actual population. This assumption needs to be justified. 
Immigrants sometimes have elevated fertility after arrival since they may be 
reunifying families or “catching up” following disrupted family lives (Hervitz 
1985; Andersson 2004). On the other hand, some migrants may be self-
selected for lower fertility, possibly being more highly educated and career 
oriented, and migration may delay or inhibit family formation. There has been 
considerable discussion of the interpretation of migrant and non-migrant 
fertility data and of how pre- and post-arrival patterns can be combined to 
control for the effect of migration disruption (Toulemon 2004).2 However, for 
my analysis this is not an issue on substantive or technical grounds. Such 
disruption effects are mainly associated with non-European migrants, and 
there is little evidence of this effect for the European populations we are 
concerned with (Andersson 2004; Devolder and Bueno 2011).  
While the proportion of births to overseas-born mothers around 2013 
exceeded 25 percent in a number of European countries including Belgium, 
Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and 20 percent in 
France, Spain, and Italy (Eurostat 2013), these proportions were much smaller 
in the past. Around 1900, some 3 percent of the population in France and 
Denmark, 2 percent in Norway, and 1 percent in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom were foreign-born (Williamson and Hatton 2005, Table 2.2), and 
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these migrants were overwhelmingly from other European societies with 
similar levels of fertility so the effect on the overall average fertility level was 
very small.  
Studies suggest that the fertility of second- and later-generation 
immigrants tends to move toward the prevailing level of fertility (Glusker 2003; 
Parrado and Morgan 2008; Waters and Pineau 2015). Convergence of fertility 
to national levels among descendants of some recent migrant groups to 
Europe from countries that have higher fertility than the native population 
appears to be proceeding more slowly than for descendants of other migrant 
groups (Kulu et al. 2015). However, non-European migrants were rare in the 
past and the main trend was of migrants leaving European countries rather 
than the entering, with the largest inflows being of return migrants (King 
1996). Fertility of intra-European immigrants is similar to levels in the host 
country across European countries (OECD/European Union 2015). Over the 
extended period of this study, there is no evidence that emigrants were likely 
to achieve either higher or lower fertility abroad than if they had remained in 
their original country. 
In terms of the model used, if observed fertility was higher than native 
fertility but lower than immigrant fertility, this would result in a slightly higher 
number of births in the no-net-migration case than if native-only values had 
been used. The method would therefore under-estimate the impact of 
migration on population change and my results would, if anything, be 
conservative.  
The overall long-term impact of migration on population includes the 
contribution of both migrants and their offspring. Population gain (or loss) 
through migration increasingly depends on the descendants of migrants rather 
than on first-generation migrants. Since I am concerned not only with the 
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fertility of migrants but also with that of their descendants, who tend to adapt 
to prevailing levels, this further supports the case for assuming the same 
fertility for all population groups in this study. One cannot conclude that 
emigrants would have had the same fertility that they achieved abroad had 
they remained in their original country, but there appears to be no strong 
reason for my initial counterfactual scenarios to assume that the fertility of 
migrants differed from that of the populations I am concerned with.3 It is 
reasonable to assume that an individual of a given age at a particular time will 
have the same average flow of population numbers in years to come (in the 
case of an emigrant, this flow will be negative) irrespective of migration status, 
but this assumption could be amended if appropriate. 
The models are concerned with net migration rather than gross flows. 
With assimilation, these descendants will increasingly be born to parents with 
different migrant backgrounds, and any distinction between migrant and non-
migrant becomes meaningless at the individual level.4 Net migration is a 
meaningful macro-level determinant of population size, and the contribution 
of net migration occurring in a particular period to population numbers at any 
given time can be identified uniquely with the assumptions discussed above. I 
now consider these results in detail. 
 
Results 
For each country I set net migration to zero from a series of start years 5 years 
apart between 1850 (or the first available year) and 2000. Rates before the 
date from which migration is set to zero remain unaltered. This makes it 
possible to assess the long-term effects of migration on population at various 
time periods up to the latest available year. Six countries had negative net 
migration rates averaged over the whole period: the Nordic countries apart 
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from Denmark, as well as Italy and Scotland; three had rates close to zero:  
Denmark, England and Wales, and the Netherlands; and France and 
Switzerland had positive rates (Table 1). Scotland had a negative rate twice as 
large as the next country, Norway. Switzerland had the largest positive rate, 
followed by France. While the average net migration rate over all observations 
for these populations was zero, there was a shift over time. In the nineteenth 
century, all 11 countries had a net outflow, but over the twentieth century the 
trend was toward positive inflows, so that by the twenty-first century all rates 
were positive. The patterns were heterogeneous across both time and space, 
so I now consider how these affect population sizes over this extended period. 
Population change is the sum of natural increase and net migration 
according to the balancing equation, which provides an estimate of how much 
each contributes to population change in a short time interval. However, if the 
impact of migration is measured by the difference in population sizes with and 
without migration, the balancing equation does not provide an estimate of the 
relative contributions of natural change and net migration, since the offspring 
of immigrants will contribute to natural increase and—more importantly for 
long-term European experience—the “missing” offspring of emigrants will 
have the reverse effect.  
I now show how these migration differences translate into differences in 
population sizes with and without migration since 1850 (or the first available 
year) (Table 2). Because fertility and mortality rates are the same in both cases 
over the period, the only difference is the effect of migration. Therefore I use 
the ratio of the actual population to the no-net-migration population in the 
final year as the estimate of the total impact of migration—not just migrants—
on population size from a specific date. The ranking of countries on this ratio is 
similar to that of the overall net migration rate in Table 1, and the correlation 
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coefficient between these two variables is 0.98. As expected, countries with 
smaller population sizes than would be the case without migration mainly have 
negative net migration rates, and those with larger sizes have positive rates.  
The observed total population size was about 2.4 times larger at the end 
of the period than at the start, slightly below the ratio of 2.5 in the no-net-
migration case. Ratios varied across countries, with observed growth ratios 
ranging between 1.8 in France and 5.5 in the Netherlands. The impact of 
migration also differed substantially. The shortfall in population size between 
the no-net-migration and the actual populations is particularly marked in the 
case of Italy, which has about 16 million fewer people, or about 20 percent 
smaller, in 2012 than if it had experienced no migration throughout the late 
nineteenth and all of the twentieth centuries. Norway is about 30 percent 
smaller and Scotland over 50 percent smaller than if there had been no 
migration. In contrast, France shows a population with 15 million more people 
(about 30 percent larger) in 2013, and Switzerland has 2.5 million more people 
(nearly 50 percent larger) than if net migration had been zero over the past 
century and a half. Broadly similar net migration rates are seen in Norway, 
Sweden, and Iceland, but Denmark, England and Wales, and the Netherlands 
have broadly similar population sizes with and without migration. In the first 
two of these countries, the actual population including migration overtook the 
no-net-migration population only recently, and the same is likely to happen to 
the Netherlands during this decade. It is not, of course, the case that there was 
no migration but rather that the impact of emigration on population change in 
these three countries was largely offset by the gains from immigration.  
The levels of net migration experienced were sufficient to produce 
population sizes between about 50 percent lower and 50 percent higher than 
would have been the case without net migration. However, the levels were 
12   
negatively correlated with population growth, therefore the effect of migration 
was to reduce differences in growth rates over the period. In the absence of 
net migration, at the tails of the distribution, I estimate that the population of 
France would have increased by only 40 percent rather than 80 percent over 
the period 1850–2013, whereas Iceland would have increased by 580 percent 
rather than by 440 percent. Switzerland and France, the two countries with 
growth ratios of the no-net-migration population below the average ratio of 
2.49 over the period (based on the combined total population), experienced 
positive contributions to growth from migration, whereas eight out of the nine 
countries with above-average ratios experienced negative contributions (if 
England and Wales and Scotland were combined and shown as Great Britain, 
all values would be negative). The standard deviation of the ratio of final to 
initial actual population size, 1.20, is smaller than the standard deviation of 
1.52 for the ratio of the final no-net-migration to initial population sizes (Table 
2). This suggests that migration has tended to reduce long-term variability in 
growth rates compared with what they might otherwise have been, reinforcing 
the suggestion of a positive impact of population growth on gross transatlantic 
flows over the period (Easterlin 1961; Hatton and Williamson 1994). 
Migration patterns varied across time between countries. Figure 1(a) 
shows population sizes for four large exemplar countries that have different 
patterns. Population sizes for the other seven countries are shown in Figure 
1(b). I present the expected population size if net migration was set to zero 
from selected start years. Since estimates for two different start years have the 
same fertility and mortality rates in all years and the same migration rates in 
years outside this range, the difference between the two final-year population 
estimates is due to different net migration in the intervening years between 
the start dates. The overall difference between the final observed population 
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and the no-net-migration population from the first available year can therefore 
be attributed to migration in the intervening time periods.  
While there have been some changes in migration over time (Table 1), 
the net effect of migration in England and Wales was small over this period, 
even though there were considerable outflows to countries such as the US and 
Australia. The actual population size is located within a narrow range of 
estimates based on no net migration starting at various time points, only 
exceeding these estimates in the most recent period. In contrast, Italy had 
substantial net outflows especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as measured by changes in final-year population sizes from different 
start dates. Net migration over 1880–1910 accounted for well over half of the 
total impact of migration since 1873 on the contemporary Italian population. 
Net migration continued to be negative until the late twentieth century when 
the situation was reversed.  
France exhibited a different time pattern. Although considerable 
attention has been given to Italian transatlantic migration, about half of Italian 
emigration was within Europe and especially to France in this period (Castles 
and Miller 2009, p. 87). France experienced high rates of in-migration from the 
early twentieth  century, but with a sharp temporary increase around 1960 
related to major inflows of French citizens following independence of former 
French colonies in North Africa that contributed to the substantial impact of 
the 1940–1970 period in Figure 1 (the re-integration of Alsace-Lorraine 
following wartime annexation also had some influence). Switzerland was the 
other country with substantial inflows although with a later start to mass 
immigration. There was little impact until the mid-twentieth century but 
migration accelerated sharply in the immediate postwar period, which 
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increased current population size by about one quarter, and high levels of 
migration have continued until the present. 
Although this selection of 11 countries mainly from Northern and 
Western Europe is not random, they cover the majority of people in these 
regions and show that patterns over the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries are heterogeneous. In general, there is a tendency for net migration 
to move from being largely negative to largely positive over the period. In 
some cases, however, the major net flows occurred in the nineteenth century 
while in others they occurred in the twentieth; some countries had relatively 
constant patterns over time, such as Finland; others, such as Sweden, switched 
from high outflow to high inflow (Table 1 and Figure 1(b)). 
Impact of net migration on population size 
The 11 countries exhibit a range of net migration and natural growth regimes 
(Table 2). I now consider the consequences of these two variables for overall 
population growth. I suggested that the ratio at the final year of the actual 
population to the population with no net migration from the start year is an 
indicator of the effect of net migration over the intervening period since the 
two populations have the same fertility and mortality regimes and therefore 
observed differences can be attributed to migration differences. Since net 
migration is a continuous variable, one would expect similar demographic 
responses, for example, if net migration were to change by similar amounts in 
situations of positive and negative net out-migration. One would expect the 
ratio of actual and no-migration population sizes at the last available year (LAY) 
to be directly related to the exponential of the net migration rate, NMR, i.e. 
the model is:  
Pactual(LAY)/ Pnomig(LAY) = exp(βNMR), 
15   
where P(LAY) denotes total population size in LAY for the actual and no-net-
migration estimates as before, and NMR is the mean net migration rate per 
1,000 population over the whole period, taken from Tables 1 and 2. I present 
regression results in Table 3 and Figure 2(a) for this model fitted as 
MigEffect = βNMR,  (3) 
where MigEffect = ln(Pactual(LAY)/ Pnomig(LAY)), the log of the cross-sectional 
ratios at the final year. I do not weight these for relative population sizes since 
they are regarded as 11 separate demographic entities. 
The relationship in Figure 2(a) is strongly linear. I expect the constant 
term to be statistically insignificant on theoretical grounds, since the actual 
and no-migration populations should be similar in magnitude when NMR is 
close to zero. This is the case and therefore I show results for the model fitted 
without a constant term. 
The fitted model is Pactual(LAY)/ Pnomig(LAY) = exp(.22NMR). The response 
is the same across the whole range, so that, for example, an increase of 1 per 
1,000 in the average net migration rate for a century and a half would result in 
population size larger by about 25 percent (since exp(.22)=1.25), or an annual 
average increase of 1.4 per 1,000, than would otherwise have been the case 
irrespective of whether the initial value was positive or negative. The response 
also suggests that the result is relatively insensitive to the distribution of 
migration rates across the period and that the overall mean net migration rate 
captures almost all cross-national variation since it accounts for 98 percent of 
variance. These values were fitted to demographic regimes with total fertility 
rates ranging from over 5 births per woman to less than 1.3 and with life 
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expectancy at birth (both sexes) ranging from under 20 years to over 80, 
therefore including virtually all contemporary global demographic regimes. 
I now combine migration and natural change to assess their relative 
contribution to population growth across Europe. 
Contribution of intrinsic and net migration rates to overall population growth 
The mean levels of net migration are directly related to the ratio of actual to 
no-net-migration populations at the end of the period, so I use an analogous 
indicator to show the impact of natural changes arising from the fertility and 
mortality regimes experienced over this extended period. I use the intrinsic 
rate of growth, the principal indicator of underlying natural population change, 
which I expect to be related to the ratio of the final no-migration population to 
the initial population (a year when the actual and no-migration populations are 
identical). I specify the model as:  
Pnomig(LAY)/ Pactual(FAY) = αexp(γr), 
where FAY refers to the first available year and r is the mean intrinsic rate of 
growth over the whole period, Figure 2(b).  
The pattern again is strongly linear and I present regression coefficients 
in Table 3 for the model  
NoMigTrend = ln(α) + γr,  (4) 
where NoMigTrend = ln(Pnomig(LAY)/ Pactual(FAY)) is the change over the whole 
period in the no-migration population. 
I include a constant term since the intrinsic rate of growth shows the 
underlying growth rate for a population with fixed fertility and mortality rates, 
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which is not the case here. A population such as that of France with an average 
intrinsic growth rate of zero and no migration over 160 years would still have 
grown considerably. The main reason is that the annual number of births 
would be expected to be relatively constant, but, with improving mortality, the 
population size corresponding to a constant number of births will be much 
larger. It appears that improvements in mortality are so similar across these 11 
countries that a single constant is sufficient to account for this development. 
The single index of the mean value of r clearly accounts for a very substantial 
fraction of cross-national variation, again explaining 98 percent of variability in 
equation 4. 
To assess the joint impact of net migration and natural change on 
population growth, I regress overall change as measured by the ratio of final to 
initial actual populations on these two independent variables:  
Pactual(LAY)/ Pactual(FAY) = αexp(γr + βNMR), 
which I fit as 
PopTrend = ln(α) + γr + βNMR,       (5) 
where PopTrend = ln(Pactual(LAY)/ PactualFAY)) is the overall growth in population 
size over the whole period. 
Note that adding equations 3 and  4 gives an equation of the same form 
as equation 5, although the fitting procedures differ and the estimated 
coefficients are not identical. However, Table 3 shows that the coefficients of 
equation 5 are very similar to the individual coefficients from equations 3 and 
4, suggesting that the overall growth can usefully be decomposed into these 
two components in a robust way. 
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To show the relative importance of net migration and natural change for 
population growth over the period, I present the coefficients of equation 5 as 
standardized coefficients, i.e. the response to a change of one standard 
deviation in the independent variables in Table 3. The two coefficients are 
broadly similar in magnitude, with the intrinsic rate of growth being about 50 
percent larger than the net migration rate. However, the correlation of the net 
migration rate with overall population growth is zero (Table 4), although net 
migration is a component of overall growth, whereas it is relatively strongly 
negatively related to the intrinsic rate of growth, which is structurally 
independent of migration. Net migration and natural change are both 
important, and migration offsets natural increase. It is not possible to establish 
whether high growth stimulated out-migration or the option of out-migration 
influenced fertility levels, but Hatton and Williamson (1994) argue that 
migration is influenced by population growth about 25 years earlier.  
Conclusions 
While European societies such as those analyzed here may appear to have had 
broadly similar demographic patterns over the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, with relatively similar levels of fertility and mortality at each end of 
the period, population growth has been heterogeneous. France’s population 
increased by 80 percent over the period around 1850 to around 2010, whereas 
the Netherlands increased by 450 percent over the same period. Even two 
constituent parts of Great Britain showed very different growth:  89 percent in 
Scotland compared with 223 percent in England and Wales principally due to 
differences in net migration over the period, a fact that was used to underpin 
arguments for Scottish independence in the 2014 referendum (Murphy 2016). 
Large-scale inter-continental migration started in the early decades of the 
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nineteenth century, but the volume became much greater from about 1850 
and especially after 1880 when many of these countries started irreversible 
fertility decline.  
Difficulties in obtaining detailed migration data persist. The data used 
here are not measured directly, but are estimates based on models that have 
been extensively used as the definitive dataset on long-term cross-national 
mortality trends. I used a number of simple demographic methods to 
incorporate migration more centrally into population dynamics. Although 
there is no relationship between overall population growth and levels of net 
migration, the relatively strong negative relationship between net migration 
and natural increase in these countries demonstrates that migration has been 
influential in shifting population growth toward the overall mean through its 
interaction with natural growth. While net migrant numbers may appear small, 
they have had a substantial impact on long-term population developments, 
leading to populations 50 percent lower or higher across Europe with the 
models presented here. 
While my emphasis is on long-term trends, the data also highlight the 
major change in international migration beginning around the end of the 
twentieth century. For the first time, net migration has been positive in 
virtually all cases, partly as a result of large-scale movements from Eastern to 
Western Europe following the expansion of the EU. Migration levels are also 
much higher than previously. In some cases, such as England and Wales, net 
migration since the beginning of the twenty-first century is considerably 
greater than the cumulative level over the previous 150 years. Italy, which 
historically had been the country with the largest population deficit due to 
migration, had the largest positive net inflow of 2.4 million people in the first 
20   
decade of the century, over 2 million more than in the previous decade. Most 
other countries experienced a more gradual increase, but also exhibited 
increasing population sizes as the descendants of earlier migrants also 
contribute to population growth. The number of migrants has continued to rise 
largely as a response to continuing conflict in the Middle East. In the most 
recent period, the International Organisation for Migration (2016) estimated 
that just over one million migrants from outside Europe arrived in 2015 alone, 
although the preferred destination for many of these is Germany, which is not 
included in this analysis.  
It may be too early to identify migration as the defining characteristic of 
this century, especially since international migrants still account for only 3 
percent of the world's population (United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs Population Division 2013). Nevertheless, comparison of 
recent trends with the long-term trends presented here suggests that a major 
change in the nature of international migration in Europe is occurring and that 
the regularities identified above may not persist.  
Notes 
Thanks are due to the University of California, Berkeley, and the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research for access to the Human Mortality 
Database (http: //www.mortality.org/cgi-bin/hmd/DataAvailability.php), and 
to the statistical offices in England and Wales and Scotland for provision of 
original data (http: //www.mortality.org/hmd/GBR_SCO/DOCS/ref.pdf). 
                                                          
1 Only net migration directly influences population dynamics through the 
balancing equation. The method compares the actual population with the no-
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net-migration case, which is the most obvious starting point for assessing the 
impact of migration. The assumption is that net migration is zero within each 
age and sex group, so that any emigrant is replaced by an immigrant with the 
same profile. This assumption can be easily relaxed in order to compare the 
actual population with one having an arbitrary net migration pattern. The 
model can also be extended to include explicit consideration of both inflows 
and outflows of migrants, but this is not done for a number of formal and 
substantive reasons.  
Differences between demographic patterns of immigrants, emigrants, and 
static populations in Europe over most of the period studied here were 
relatively small, so there would be little difference in practice. Since I am 
concerned with the long-term consequences of migration when the patterns of 
descendants of migrants tend to become similar to the indigenous population, 
and indeed they become part of the indigenous population, even any initial 
differences would become increasingly diluted. In order to extend the model, 
information would be required on the numbers of both immigrants and 
emigrants by age and sex, and on their fertility and mortality patterns. Such 
data are lacking for the 11 historical populations that I am concerned with. The 
inventory of data on migration flows from the early nineteenth century from 
the Oxford University International Migration Institute (IMI) DEMIG project 
http: //www.imi.ox.ac.uk/data/demig-data shows the limited information 
available. Information on international migrants by age, sex, and origin since 
1990 is available from the United Nations for all countries of the world (http: 
//www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/
estimates15.shtml). The OECD also has a number of international migration 
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databases again relating to the recent past (http: 
//www.oecd.org/els/mig/oecdmigrationdatabases.htm). The World Bank 
Global Bilateral Migration Database (http: 
//databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=global-bilateral-
migration) includes matrixes of bilateral migrant stocks over the period 1960–
2000 (Özden et al., 2011).The quality and availability of the data are patchy 
and problematic.  
2 The role of migration and fertility on reproduction has often been concerned 
implicitly with the implications for long-term population growth, although the 
main focus is often on topics such as the relative distribution of native to 
migrant births. Research on this topic falls into two main approaches. The first 
is the production of indicators concerned mainly with the ratio of the numbers 
of women in successive generations, allowing for the fact that migration as 
well as fertility will influence these numbers. This approach follows from initial 
work by Calot and Sardón (2001), which is closely related to the method used 
here, although age-specific fertility rates are required unlike in our case. A 
substantial number of alternative indicators of reproduction that include 
migration have been developed subsequently and are summarized and 
compared in Ediev et al. (2015, Table 1). The other main approach is concerned 
with incorporating differential fertility of first-generation migrant and 
indigenous groups and the construction of composite indictors allowing for 
distortions in standard measures due to the migration event itself (Toulemon, 
2004).  
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3 The total impact of migration is the difference between the loss of people 
and their subsequent progeny due to emigration and the corresponding gain 
due to immigrants. The standard assumption of no-migration scenarios 
produced by official agencies is that fertility and mortality rates are the same 
with and without migration, implicitly that rates of immigrants are the same as 
those of the destination population, whereas those of emigrants would have 
been the same as in their original population.  
4 Studies that include both migrants and non-migrants are usually concerned 
with the relative numbers of the two groups. Even though it has been argued 
that "for demographic purposes, the continued separation of the components 
is essential for any meaningful analysis" (Ediev et al. 2014, p. 628), separation 
of the overall population into indigenous populations defined as those with 
long-term local ancestry and migrant populations is problematic. For separate 
analyses of sub-populations, information about the demographic 
characteristics of each group is also required, but these have been largely 
lacking until recent periods. While information about first-generation migrants 
is increasingly available, the long-term contribution of migration mainly arises 
from the fertility behavior of descendants of the original migrants. Information 
on second-generation migrants even now is not widely available, and it is 
almost non-existent for third and later generations. Over time, descendants of 
migrants tend to become more integrated through assimilation and 
intermarriage, hence separation into one of two groups becomes increasingly 
arbitrary (Edmonston 2010). 
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TABLE 1   Average net migration rate (per 1,000 population) for selected periods to the latest 
available year 
      Average net migration rate (per 1,000) 
















Denmark 1850 2011 0.1 –1.2 0.4 0.6 2.3 
England and 
Wales 1850 2013 0.2 –0.7 –0.3 0.6 4.1 
Finland 1878 2012 –0.5 –0.4 –1.0 –0.7 1.9 
France 1850 2013 1.5 –0.4 3.0 1.8 2.0 
Iceland 1850 2013 –1.3 –3.3 –0.9 –0.7 2.6 
Italy 1874 2012 –0.9 –2.9 –1.7 –0.4 6.0 
Netherlands 1850 2012 0.0 –1.2 –0.2 1.2 1.1 
Norway 1850 2014 –1.2 –4.6 –2.0 0.8 4.4 
Scotland 1855 2013 –3.1 –2.8 –5.0 –3.2 3.2 
Sweden 1850 2014 –0.3 –3.7 –0.7 1.9 4.4 
Switzerland 1876 2011 1.8 –0.6 0.2 3.4 6.8 
Totala Initial Final 0.0 –1.2 –0.2 0.7 3.2 
 
NOTE: Rates are averages of annual net migration rates over the period. 
aBased on first and last years for which country values are available. 
SOURCE: Author’s estimates based on Human Mortality Database 
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TABLE 2   Relationship between population size in initial and final year, with and without migration 
  Population (thousands) Ratio   




Final no migration to 
Initial 
Final to Final no 
migration Net reproduction rate 
Denmark 1,407 5,561 5,812 3.95 4.13 0.96 1.22 
England and 
Wales 17,579 56,761 53,853 3.23 3.06 1.05 1.14 
Finland 1,971 5,401 5,858 2.74 2.97 0.92 1.17 
France 35,673 63,651 49,087 1.78 1.38 1.30 1.00 
Iceland 60 322 404 5.40 6.77 0.80 1.37 
Italy 27,121 59,400 75,735 2.19 2.79 0.78 1.13 
Netherlands 3,056 16,730 17,042 5.48 5.58 0.98 1.28 
Norway 1,386 5,109 7,043 3.69 5.08 0.73 1.27 
Scotland 2,812 5,321 11,406 1.89 4.06 0.47 1.21 
Sweden 3,441 9,645 10,778 2.80 3.13 0.89 1.14 
Switzerland 2,748 7,870 5,443 2.86 1.98 1.45 1.04 
Totala 97,254 235,771 242,460 2.42 2.49 0.97 - 
Standard 
deviation 
(unweighted) - - - 1.20 1.52 0.26 0.10 
 
NOTE: Years covered are shown in Table 1. 
aBased on aggregate of initial and final country values, therefore reference start and finish years vary. 
SOURCE: Author’s estimate based on Human Mortality Database. 
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NMR and intrinsic 





Constant (ln(α)) - 0.40 (0.04) 0.34 (0.05) - 
NMR (β) 0.22 (0.01) - 0.23 (0.02) 0.82 (0.08) 
Intrinsic (γ) - 0.15 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 1.28 (0.08) 
R2 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 
NOTES: for definition of variables, see text. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* refers to equation number in text  
SOURCE: Author’s estimates based on Human Mortality Database. 
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TABLE 4   Correlation coefficients of population parameters 
  




MigEffect 1 –0.58 0.09 0.99 –0.58 
NoMigTrend –0.58 1 0.76 –0.64 0.99 
PopTrend 0.09 0.76 1 0.00 0.76 




–0.58 0.99 0.76 –0.64 1 
NOTE: for definition of variables, see text. 


















































































































































































































































































































Figure 2(a). Plot of MigEffect on NMR
Note: MigEffect is logarithm of Ratio final actual to no−migration population

























Figure 2(b). Plot of NoMigTrend on Intrinsic growth rate





































Figure A.1(a). Alternative fertility distribution schedule
Age









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.3. Effect of alternative fertility distributions, France
